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Abstract: This essay situates the emergence of cybernetic concepts in postwar French thought 
within a longer history of struggles surrounding the technocratic reform of French universities, 
including Marcel Mauss’s failed efforts to establish a large-scale center for social scientific 
research with support from the Rockefeller Foundation, the intellectual and administrative 
endeavors of Claude Lévi-Strauss during the 1940s and 1950s, and the rise of communications 
research  in connection with the Centre d’Etudes des Communications de Masse (CECMAS). Although 
semioticians and poststructuralists used cybernetic discourse critically and ironically, I argue that 
their embrace of a “textocratic” perspective—that is, a theory of power and epistemology as tied 
to technical inscription—sustained elements of the technocratic reasoning linked to these efforts 
dating back to the 1920s to reform French universities.  
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Any history of cybernetics and information theory that seeks more than a mere inventory 
of influences—i.e. of natural sciences impacting the social sciences, or engineering projects by the 
U. S. military projecting their models onto the softer social and human sciences—must grapple 
with its simultaneous origins and multiple itineraries. In broad strokes, cybernetics and its sister 
science, information theory, emerged in the 1940s and early 1950s from the mathematical sciences 
and focused on the technological engineering of communication, feedback, and coding 
mechanisms to facilitate transmissions in organic and inorganic systems. Although both fields 
found impetus in the engineering tasks of World War II, their significance in subsequent decades 
bespeaks their ability to address a larger family of concerns that exceeded the exigencies of war. 
Their particular status as a topic for the history of the human sciences, and indeed these fields’ 
broader acclaim in the mid-century sciences (when many of its proposed technological applications 
depended on the hypothetical use of computational power that would not be available for decades 
to come), springs from their emergence as tools of interdisciplinary research.  The emergence of 
cybernetics as an “umbrella” or “universal” science in the 1950s and 1960s depended on a certain 
plurality, including roots sunk deep in ostensibly non-cybernetic sources and the gradual 
cultivation of cybernetic ideas in disparate milieus according to local intellectual conditions 
(Bowker, 1993; Kline 2015; Pias 2004; Turner 2006).i Considered up close and according to local 
circumstances, what looked at moments like the triumph of a master cybernetic discourse born of 
World War II and the Cold War (Haraway 1981-1982; Galison 1994; Pickering 1995; Edwards 
1996) begins to look more like a kind of pidgin whose development was closely related to the 
intermingling, bastardization, and reworking of material, often with elements of resistance, 
appropriation, and subversion as integral elements in the accommodation of the cybernetic lexicon 
to a new intellectual milieu (Haraway 2004; Light 2003). 
The city of Paris offers one site for reconstructing the plurality of cybernetics (Le Roux 
2018). Here we see the inception of cybernetics in a complex milieu that defies easy reduction to 
origins dubbed American or French, technical or cultural, scientific or social. In 1947 MIT 
mathematician Norbert Wiener, a fluent French speaker, traveled to Paris for a conference on 
harmonic analysis organized by Szolem Mandelbrojt, the eminent Polish-born mathematician 
(uncle to Benoît) (Conway and Siegelman, 2005: 171-172). Szolem had spent much of World War 
II at the Ecole Libre des Hautes Etudes, a wartime university based in New York City that was 
sponsored by the French, Belgian, and Czech-Slovak governments-in-exile and funded in large 
part by the Rockefeller Foundation, which viewed the Ecole as an opportunity for reforming 
European science in alignment with the pragmatic and technocratic agendas of promoted by 
American Progressive Era private foundations. Officers at the Rockefeller Foundation also sought 
to cultivate  alliances between American and distinguished European researchers—and, to some 
extent, to build the rudiments of a European research network tilting towards American institutions 
(Zolberg and Callamard, 1998; Geoghegan, 2011; Geoghegan 2012: 96-137). Per the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s plans, following the war Mandelbrojt had returned to his prestigious post as a 
professor of mathematics at the College de France, forging new relations between French and 
American mathematical communities in the process. 
During his trip to the conference Wiener met with Enrique Freymann, the French-Mexican 
editor of Hermann et Cie publishing, telling him of his nascent ideas on computing, communication, 
and feedback in humans and machines. “Why don't you write a book on the theories that you are 
always talking about?” Freymann asked Wiener, eliciting the reply: “No publisher would ever take 
such a risk!” Freymann slyly replied, “Oh, I think he might.” The two men shook hands, with 
Wiener promising “In three months' time I shall hand over my manuscript.” Almost impetuously, 
Wiener began writing what became Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the 
Machine, which Freymann ultimately contracted to publish. When editors at MIT Press and Wiley 
& Co. learned of the book they leaped to secure its rights, leading to simultaneous publications of 
the book in France and the United States in October 1948 (Conway and Siegelman, 2005: 171-
172; Mindell, Gerovitch and Segal, 2002: 75).ii 
By these cross-border itineraries cybernetics found its way to print—with the exhortations 
of a French-Mexican editor to a polyglot American scientist travelling to a French conference 
organized by a Polish-born scientist recently returned from his appointment at a Franco-Belgian-
Czech-Slovak university based in New York City, and with a backdrop of funding from a US-
based foundation with ambitions for global reform of society by means of scientific methods.  
Cybernetics’ appeal to scientists of diverse disciplinary, linguistic, and national backgrounds 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s lay no doubt in these multi- and transnational origins, which lent 
its methods a cosmopolitan and transdisciplinary sheen. Historian Ron Kline has labelled the 
diverse meanings scientists elicited from this field as “the disunity of cybernetics,” which he 
describes as “an ironic fate for a field that claimed to be an international, universal discipline that 
could unify the sciences” (Kline, 2015: 7). In the United States, for example, a cybernetic language 
of systems, feedback, and information served the militarist agendas of Cold War scientists as well 
as the leftwing antiauthoritarian aspirations of California hippies (as demonstrated by historians 
Paul Edwards and Fred Turner, respectively) (Edwards 1996; Turner 2006). Pace Eden Medina 
and Eglė Rindzevičiūtė, under the direction of Salvador Allende’s administration in Chile in the 
1970s cybernetics became a tool of socialist reform while also becoming an instrument of 
collaborative governance across the Iron Curtain among capitalist and socialist policymakers 
convening in Austria (Medina 2011; Rindzevičiūtė 2016). As a universal science. the cybernetic 
apparatus held together not so much around a single unified notion of communications or 
information as through the utility of notions drawn from information and communication 
technologies in translating varied concerns into a common language or framework.  
The interdisciplinary reception, interpretation, and development of cybernetics in France 
responded to distinct intellectual exigencies. The cybernetic and informational analysis that 
penetrated deep into postwar French philosophy—particularly structuralist, poststructuralist, and 
semiotic intellectual formations—formed a “cybernetic matrix” born of conflicts and intellectual 
struggles specific to postwar France (Lafontaine, 2007). The popular fascination with technology 
that accompanied the Marshall Plan and the rapid postwar industrialization of France, a creeping 
dissatisfaction with humanist and existentialist philosophy, and the stirring of a new philosophy of 
language: these were among the diverse factors that lent to cybernetics a peculiar allure among 
some French intellectuals (Ross, 1995: 1-14, 157-196). Proponents and antagonists of 
Americanization, of Saussurean semiotics, and the industrial reforms spearheaded by American 
industry found resources in cybernetics to validate their philosophies and test the limits of their 
intellectual positions (Mindell, Gerovitch, and Segal, 2002: 74-81). Moreover, a longstanding 
admiration in France for engineering as an instrument of political reform, embodied in the political 
power afforded to engineers at the elite Ecole Polytechnique and dating at least to nineteenth-
century utopian theorists such as Auguste Comte and the Saint-Simonians, established intellectual 
relays that would support the articulation of a cybernetic apparatus (Porter, 1996: 49-72; Tresch, 
2012: 191-221, 253-286).  
In recent years this reception has been an object of analysis by scholars including Céline 
Lafontaine, Lydia Liu, and Ronan Le Roux who have argued for the roots of structuralist and 
poststructuralist thought in cybernetics (Lafontaine, 2004; Le Roux 2007; Le Roux 2009; Liu, 
2010). These important analyses have, however, presumed an undue level of identity and unity in 
cybernetics, thereby effacing the contentious political stances that mediated the reception of 
cybernetics by French intellectuals (Cusset, 2005: Johnson, 2015). In so doing, these accounts gloss 
over the political insights and scientific ambitions of cybernetics’ French interpreters. Like British 
cultural theorist Stuart Hall’s celebrated reinterpretation of information theorists’ notions of 
“encoding” and “decoding” in a Marxist fashion, postwar French theorists’ reinterpretations of 
cybernetics and information theory offered “radically different wine in what at first appeared to be 
old [cybernetic] bottles,” where continuity in terminology masked the subversion of shared 
conceptual paradigms (Gurevitch and Scannell, 2003: 245). French cultural theorists employed 
information theories to reflect on the communicative production of economics, politics, and 
psychology while, often simultaneously, reflecting on the economical, political, and cultural 
constitution of techno-scientific accounts of communications.  
This article considers the reception of cybernetics in France through a series of intellectual 
moments, which together chart the intellectual currents that directed the uptake of cybernetic 
reasoning in France after World War II. Wiener’s inspiration to write a book about cybernetics 
marks one privileged moment when French and American currents crossed to produce cybernetics, 
but that moment appears within a longer series dating back to the 1920s and persisting well into 
the 1970s. In the pages that follow, the earliest moment under consideration is French sociologist 
Marcel Mauss’s failed efforts to establish a large-scale center for social scientific research with 
support from the US-based Rockefeller Foundation, an institution that prominently promoted 
information theory and cybernetics in the years after World War II (Geoghegan, 2011; Geoghegan 
2017). Mauss’s failure to reach an accord with the Rockefeller Foundation casts light on a 
subsequent moment, in the 1950s, when Franco-Belgian anthropologist Lévi-Strauss and Jacques 
Lacan selectively adapted elements of cybernetic thought to postwar French thought, in part 
through Lévi-Strauss’s links to the Rockefeller Foundation and his innovative rereading of Mauss’s 
social theory. The next moment under consideration is the tentative, ironic application of 
cybernetics and information theory in the early 1960s by Roland Barthes and other affiliates of the 
Centre d’Etudes des Communications de Masse (CECMAS). Despite their success in developing a critical, 
historical, and political outlook that called into question the politics of cybernetic reason, their 
embrace of a “textocratic” perspective—that is, a theory of power and epistemology as tied to 
technical inscription—sustained elements of the technocratic logic undergirding cybernetics and 
the Rockefeller Foundation agenda.  
 
The Difficulties of Gift-Giving 
In 1949, in a successful bid to win research funding from the Rockefeller Foundation, linguist 
Roman Jakobson embraced elements of cybernetics and information theory as the future of the 
human sciences. A fluent French speaker who taught courses at the Ecole Libre during the war, 
Jakobson commanded a far-reaching intellectual network in the French-speaking world. Besides 
his friendship with colleagues such as Lévi-Strauss, also formerly of the Ecole Libre, Jakobson’s 
revival of the work of Ferdinand de Saussure would attract wide notice in postwar French 
intellectual circles. At the behest of Jakobson, Warren Weaver of the Rockefeller Foundation sent 
literature on information theory and cybernetics to Lévi-Strauss and Lacan, both in Paris, who 
soon began incorporating this literature into their own writing (Geoghegan, 2011). The Rockefeller 
Foundation’s missives to Lévi-Strauss and Jakobson followed on decades of effort to promote 
technocratic approaches in French social science. The Ecole Libre was one of the more decisive 
and successful steps in this series of efforts, cultivating as it did a distinguished cadre of researchers 
receptive to the idea of interdisciplinary empirical research. Because the collective writings of 
Jakobson, Lévi-Strauss, and Lacan helped define structuralist methodologies in France, their 
common embrace of cybernetic themes played a major role in securing for the jargon of cybernetics 
a place within postwar France. In particular, Lévi-Strauss adopted an interpretation of French 
social scientist Marcel Mauss’s social theory, according to which primitive practices of gift-giving 
constituted systems of cybernetic communication (Lévi-Strauss, 1987; Lévi-Strauss, 1953). This 
seminal interpretation, which paved the way for a conflation of linguistic, economic, social, and 
technological systems of “communication,” also enabled a technocratic worldview that in turn 
elided key differences between technological and linguistic communications in thinkers as diverse 
as Barthes, Baudrillard, philosopher Jacques Derrida, and psychoanalyst Félix Guattari.  
While much discussion of cybernetics—in the mid-twentieth century, as now—concerned 
its promise to usher forth a new technical era of digital machines and human-machine 
communications, its earliest reception in France reflected a strong awareness of its imbrication with 
certain political aspirations and its potential to reform scientific collaboration.   A review of 
Wiener’s Cybernetics in Le Monde in 1948 by Dominican priest Dominique Dubarle hailed the new 
communication science as a prophetic and disturbing study that cast light upon the role that 
mathematical analysis and computing machines were poised to play in future world governance. 
Referencing Hobbes’ Leviathan, Dubarle positioned Cybernetics as a contribution to natural and to 
political science equally. According to his reading, “the human processes which constitute the 
object of government may be assimilated to games in the sense in which [John] von Neumann has 
studied them mathematically” (Wiener, 1988: 179). “Perhaps,” he added, “it would not be a bad 
idea for the teams at present creating cybernetics to add to their cadre of technicians, who have 
come from all horizons of science, some serious anthropologists, and perhaps a philosopher who 
has some curiosity as to world matters” (Wiener, 1988: 180). 
Dubarle’s interest in studying cybernetics in an interdisciplinary milieu speaks in part to the 
legacy of technocracy and technicist thinking in French intellectual and political life. Historian 
Theodore Porter once noted, “[t]he United States gave us the word ‘technocracy,’ but France 
seems to have some claim on the thing itself” (Porter, 1996: 114). With this remark Porter had in 
mind the privileged role afforded by engineers, statisticians, and other technical experts in 
administering the French state. The Ecole Polytechnique, an elite university for engineers, was born 
of the French Revolution and founded upon the dream that engineers could build a better, more 
rational society (Alder, 1997). The positivism of Auguste Comte and Saint-Simonianism celebrated 
the power of engineering, technology, and reason to reform society. When the Ecole Pratique des 
Hautes Etudes was established in 1868 to conjoin scientific research and educational practice in a 
single institution (Mazon, 1988: 22-25; Fournier, 2006: 40-43), the founders hoped to institute a 
faculty that would rival their Teutonic colleagues and further consolidate French national power. 
It was there that Ferdinand de Saussure and his colleagues, charged with consolidating and 
promoting the French language in the 1880s and 1890s, would collaborate with physiologists to 
develop the rudiments of an approach to structural linguistics that was, as noted by historian 
Robert Brain, “shot through with the political and social interests of the French state, which in key 
respects were mediated by the phonetics laboratory” (Brain, 1998: 251). In this respect the mid-
twentieth century commingling of Saussurean structural linguistics with new research in 
cybernetics and information theory appeared to fulfill a long dormant ambition to scientize the 
study of language and communications.   
The factors that wed science to technocracy in France, however, also militated against the 
activities of the Rockefeller Foundation there. Well in to the 1930s more technical fields such as 
engineering and mathematics received strong support from the French state, while social and 
economic sciences occupied a marginal place at institutions such as the Ecole Pratique des Hautes 
Etudes. The state had consistently chosen to favor more “applied” sciences in its program of national 
scientific development (Mazon, 1988: 17-21). Vying strategies of scientific funding also retarded 
the development of the social sciences in France. Technocracy, in the French context, meant the 
authority of a coterie of centralized experts credentialed and underwritten by the state. The 
American conceptualization of technocracy, by contrast, related to the beneficent effects of private 
initiatives. Granting officers at American private foundations cultivated cadres of entrepreneurial 
scientists who would write grants, assemble teams, and keep careful track of accounts while 
developing practical methods for promoting “social control” independent of the state. This 
American approach to technocracy tended to favor individual and private initiative, which subtly 
inflected the theoretical stances underlying supported initiatives, reinforcing the general American 
preference for empirical social science that supported ideas of individual agency. From this 
perspective, it is perhaps not surprising that the Rockefeller Foundation made relatively slow 
progress in France, where not only research but models of social change itself tended towards a 
more holistic model. Whereas its model of privately funded research and ad hoc institutes was ill-
adapted to the entrenched forms of French scientific research, its hope of establishing institutes and 
research topics autonomous from the university and existing institutions rejected the dominant 
logic of French science.  
 The Rockefeller Foundation's vexed relationship with eminent sociologist and 
anthropologist Mauss provides an instructive example of the American agency's difficulties in 
France. In 1917, an early incarnation of the Rockefeller Foundation's social sciences division, the 
Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial (LSRM), established an office in Paris as the seat of 
operations for reforming European social sciences and cultivated relations with Mauss, the favored 
nephew of Emile Durkheim. Born in 1872, Mauss studied religious sciences at the Ecole Pratique in 
the 1890s and had taught there since the early 1900s. By the 1920s, he was among the most 
distinguished names in French sociology. The LSRM paid for his travels to the United States in 
1926 so that he could learn about the social scientific methods being developed there and also give 
lectures on French ethnography (Fournier, 2006: 246). This was part of the Rockefeller 
Foundation's interwar programs for “cross-fertilization” among national scientific communities. 
Among his various activities, he gave a lecture at Harvard and at the University of Chicago on 
“The Unity of the Human Sciences and Their Mutual Relationship: Anthropology, Psychology, 
Social Science.” Building on the traditions of Henderson and Dewey and with the support of the 
Rockefeller Foundation, the University of Chicago at that time had become one of the world's 
leading centers for the integration of scientific, theoretical, and practical social science. Mauss was 
impressed, in particular by social scientists' influence in policy circles, (Fournier, 2006: 247-8).  
hailing the achievement of the “great” American people that had placed “its entire social system, 
its entire demographic composition, as well as its destiny and its full individuality under the 
jurisdiction of a practical reason finally enlightened by science and, in any case, rationally managed 
by scientists and by the people themselves” (Fournier, 2006: 248). 
In 1929, at the invitation of the Rockefeller Foundation, Mauss prepared an application to 
found a new center for social science in Paris Mauss, 1985: 343–351). He proposed the establishment 
of a faculty of social science at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes—a so-called “Sixième 
Section,” since it would have been the sixth faculty housed at the Ecole. Mauss argued such a 
center would gather the scattered activities of French social science under one roof, fostering a 
form of unity befitting their object of study. “The unity of the social sciences,” he wrote in his 
application, “will be demonstrated only when all teachers and all students, whatever their area of 
specialization in that vast field, are obliged to meet, and do meet, in a place where the material 
means for work and contact have been expanded” (Fournier, 2006: 256).. The officers of the 
Rockefeller Foundation, however, balked at his proposal, invoking a  number of empirical and 
methodological concerns: they complained his plans were too vast, too vague, too abstract, and 
unlikely to make serious contributions to social control (Fournier, 2006: 256; Mazon 1985: 323-
327). They rejected his proposal and instead offered a lavish subvention of $350,000 to Charles 
Rist, an economist who also served on the governing board of the Bank of France, to establish an 
institute of economics and social science. The Foundation designated additional funds for training 
students and smaller grants for more modest initiatives to “familiarize the younger elements at the 
university with the methods of observation and the work necessary to solve economic, sociological, 
and political problems” and to develop “true methods for social control” (Fournier, 2006: 293).iii  
 What are we to make of the rejection of Mauss’s application? In the world of external 
funding, the role of caprice, scarcity, and opacity in decision-making militate against a decisive 
interpretation of any particular decision. Approval implies endorsement while rejection does not 
necessarily indicate opposition. Yet given the apparent enthusiasm with which members of the 
Rockefeller Foundation courted Mauss, their ultimate rejection of his proposal is striking. It hints 
at the disjunction between the methodological-political orientation of Mill and Kittredge and the 
decided skepticism of Mauss towards technocracy and the pragmatic interventionism of many 
Rockefeller-funded initiatives. Rockefeller-funded initiatives routinely delimited specific problems 
among specific populations—e.g., literacy among rural African-Americans, appreciation of 
“American” traditions at universities, the promotion of Basic English at select Chinese universities, 
the cultivation of political science in London—and convened committees to promote these 
ventures. This strategy of intervention corresponded with a rational and technical style of reasoning 
that studied phenomena in parts (or more precisely, viewed the individual as more foundational 
than collectives or relations) with the aim of manipulating and reforming individual elements in a 
society. Mauss’s search for “the unity of the social sciences,” by contrast, expressed a holistic 
conception of society that, by definition, rejected the underlying logic—individualistic, atomizing, 
and oriented towards private initiative—that guided Rockefeller-funded social science of the 1920s 
and 1930s.  
 Perhaps more to the point, Mauss viewed this individualizing and calculated pragmatism 
promoted by the Rockefeller Foundation—and the methods that produced and guided his 
research—with profound suspicion. Consider Essai sur le don (published in English as The Gift: The 
Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies), Mauss’s best-known work, which presented a 
polemical contribution to political theory in the guise of ethnographic analysis (Mauss 1990). He 
analyzed how the most local and isolated acts of gift-giving in primitive society produce cycles of 
reciprocity and debt that gradually impoverish entire tribes. This analysis offered an elegant 
portrait of how economic, legal, and moral obligations belong to a “total social fact” whose reality 
exists in the binding relations that encompass the social collective and determines even minute 
local activities. Mauss’s conclusions suggested the inadequacy of any social scientific measurement 
extracted or abstracted from the social whole. Yet the study also carried with it a trenchant critique 
of technocracy. Mauss contended that modern societies had tamed wildly fluctuating patterns of 
gift-giving by refashioning humanity as homo oeconomicus, whose commitment to “science and 
reason” reduced ethics and responsibility to cold actuarial calculations. “For a very long time,” he 
observed, “man was something different, and he has not been a machine for very long, made 
complicated by a calculating machine” Mauss, 1990: 98). Natural and social sciences, being liberal 
juridical constructs based on self-possessive individualism, were complicit in the transformation of 
humanity into a machine and society into a system of mechanically processed inputs and outputs.  
 Mauss’s inquiry expressed a skepticism about liberalism in general and individualism in 
particular that characterized French political philosophy from Rousseau to Durkheim (Douglas 
1990). The Rockefeller Foundation's initiatives, by contrast, were grounded in a commitment to 
modernization based on improved technocratic and rationalist social engineering, the division of 
social problems in tractable data sets, and ultimately the cultivation of liberal-individualist subjects 
who—through their bootstrapping enterprise—would contribute to community, economy, and 
nation. Their very program of grant-giving presumed that experts in the United States, empowered 
by the largesse and reason of their benefactor, could freely identify “sectors” for scientific reform 
and as such empower exceptional scientific individuals to liberate reason from tradition. Though 
quite suited to the privatized, localized, and de-centralized networks of American higher education, 
this research program proved (and, to some extent, proves) unsuited for the rigid, centralized, and 
techno-bureaucratic-statist framework of French education. Moreover, couched within these 
activities were covert political and philosophical assumptions about the constitution of science and 
the framework for reason itself, which varied according to the American and French traditions. 
While Mauss's reflections on the gift brought these philosophical differences into relief, they also 
furnished an oblique critique of the presumptions (or presumptuousness) of Rockefeller initiatives. 
To facilitate a true reform, a much more thoroughgoing rearrangement of French and American 
scientific, educational, and philosophical priorities was in order.  
 
Lévi-Strauss, Technocrat 
 Despite its reputation for visionary technological proposals, cybernetics—Wiener’s 
synthesis of ideas from computing, electrical engineering, and biology around notions of 
communication—showed the greatest success in its ability to align social theory with mundane 
problems of technical administration. Leading facilitators of cybernetics including Margaret Mead, 
Gregory Bateson, Frank Fremont-Smith, Heinz von Foerster, Warren Weaver, Wilbur Schramm 
divided their time between scientific research and administrative work on behalf of foundations, 
public institutions, and interdisciplinary research units. It is, then, perhaps no surprise that 
cybernetics found such enthusiastic patronage from private foundations renowned for their 
commitment to technocratic social science, including the Rockefeller Foundation, the Ford 
Foundation, the Wenner-Gren Foundation, and the Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation. Nuclear threats 
to social order, political control, schizophrenia, and colonial violence are only a few of the 
“problems” which social scientists, drawing in cybernetics, showed to be communication 
breakdowns in want of technical adjustments (Mead, 1969; Heims, 1991; Light, 2003: 35-36; 
Deutsch, 1963; Batson et al, 1956; Povinelli, 2018). Cybernetics, with its recourse of concepts such 
as encoding, decoding, information, feedback, entropy, and system, purified social analysis of 
disturbing political conclusions, lending to social scientists the appearance of cool and dispassionate 
scientism.  
 In this context, Lévi-Strauss’s embrace of cybernetics in the 1950s—and his use of 
cybernetics to recuperate Mauss for a formalist and rationalist postwar structural methodology—
takes on an ineluctable political meaning. Coming on the heels of his stint at the Rockefeller-funded 
Ecole Libre, Lévi-Strauss’s decisive role shaping the introduction of cybernetics into French social 
theory belongs to a wider story of the postwar importation of American technocracy into France.  
Lévi-Strauss’s championing of cybernetics in postwar France fits neatly within a much a broader 
reformation of French society under the modernizing impetus of the Marshall Plan and other 
projects stamped by American industry. The basis of these reforms, however, cannot be reduced 
to cybernetic analysis alone. Rather, it resided within frameworks of institutional expertise and 
technocratic collaboration, of which the Ecole Libre was but one embodiment. Consider Lévi-
Strauss’s success at the Ecole Libre of securing alignments among multifarious political, scholarly, 
and intellectual agendas. While at the Ecole he demonstrated himself to be a skilled administrator, 
particularly at the interface of French and American bureaucracies. Lévi-Strauss worked with 
various government bodies—French and American—throughout the war, with an eye to 
supporting the Americans’ “Good Neighbor” policy towards Latin America and lacing together 
elements of French, Latin American, and US-American communities of interest.iv  
 More than once, Lévi-Strauss’s facility negotiating the interface between political 
administration and social science brought him to the concerned attention of the U. S. Federal 
government. Shortly before his arrival to the United States, an anonymous informant from 
Poughkeepsie, New York wrote a postcard to J. Edgar Hoover identifying Lévi-Strauss as part of 
a cabal of “Jewish international communists,” and thus brought him to the attention of the FBI.v 
As Lévi-Strauss undertook the management of the center at the Ecole Libre, FBI agents began 
intercepting his mail and making inquiries in New York. They scrupulously inventoried Lévi-
Strauss’s prewar undertakings in South America, his work at the Ecole Libre, and his various 
activities consulting and broadcasting speeches for the U. S. government. Hoover did not like what 
he saw. In one ominous memo, he noted a recent informant's claim that Lévi-Strauss and one of 
his colleagues in the propaganda services, Surrealist André Breton, were “closely connected with 
a group in Mexico which is very bad, having something on their minds different from what the rest 
of us have on our minds.”vi A few years later, at the war’s end, Lévi-Strauss, by then a cultural 
attaché in service of the French government, shocked a representative with the OSS (the 
forerunner of the CIA) with the intimation of his belief that “it might have been better to kill 50,000 
[French] collaborationists immediately” than undertake an arduous process of political trials 
(Mehlman, 2000: 181). 
 Over the latter half of the 1940s and well into the 1950s, Lévi-Strauss applied these finely-
honed political skills to cultivating exchange between France and the United States. Following the 
landings in Normandy in 1944, de Gaulle's government summoned Lévi-Strauss to Paris to 
represent the state in helping French intellectuals visit the United States. War had left the French 
universities in disrepair and isolation from colleagues abroad, and Lévi-Strauss—by dint of his 
wartime experience and avid loyalty to de Gaulle—was deemed ideally suited to re-articulate 
relations and exchanges between the two nations’ universities. In 1945, he returned to the United 
States as Cultural Attaché to the French Embassy, where he continued in a similar capacity, 
assisting the likes of Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, and Albert Camus as they made their 
way to and in the United States (Wilcken, 2010: 154). As a representative of the Ecole, Lévi-Strauss, 
along with physicist Pierre Auger, met with Rockefeller Foundation officers to discuss plans for the 
future of the Ecole Libre. Lévi-Strauss proposed re-establishing l’Ecole Libre as a new center in 
Paris to be called “the French-European American Foundation.”vii Lengthy negotiations, and 
additional support secured from the Ford Foundation, resulted in the establishment of the long-
sought but never before realized Sixième Section of the Ecole Pratique, later renamed Ecole des Hautes 
Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS).  
 How did Lévi-Strauss succeed at securing a rapprochement among American 
philanthropies and French institutions, exactly where his eminent predecessor Mauss had failed? 
Commenting on the origins of the school, latter-day faculty member Pierre Bourdieu once 
complained that the EHESS was an instrument of “social control” deployed by American 
foundations to counteract Marxist criticism (Bourdieu, 1988: i). This is true, but the new 
instruments of control depended on a new infrastructure of administrators, technocrats, and 
methods that permitted an interface between American and French institutions. Lévi-Strauss was 
prepared to support that infrastructure in a manner Mauss never could. He and a large contingent 
of colleagues had cultivated relationships, methods, and purposes throughout the war that 
established the possibility for a new partnership. In short, Lévi-Strauss became something of a 
professional administrator during these years, including his appointment as 1952 Secretary 
General at UNESCO, where he championed the use of cybernetics as a social scientific tool for 
political management (Bertholet, 2008: 211-13; Lévi-Strauss, 1976a; Lévi-Strauss, 1954).viii  
In this embrace of cybernetics alongside an accumulation of technocratic roles and 
responsibilities, Lévi-Strauss followed a well-trodden path already marked out by aforementioned 
cybernetic experts such as Mead and Bateson. Where Mauss elaborated social theories that seemed 
to sabotage the epistemological and administrative aims of American technocracy and its 
handmaidens in social science, Lévi-Strauss seized upon the language of cybernetics and preached 
its message at major international conferences. In the hands of Lévi-Strauss, social theory, 
technocratic administration, and intercultural mediation aligned. Perhaps more remarkably, their 
alignment took place under the sign of a cybernetic Mauss, whom he construed as a cybernetician 
avant la technique. Much as Mead and Bateson reinterpreted the Culture and Personality school of 
anthropology in cybernetic terms, thereby accommodating it to the technocratic dictates of 
postwar behavioral sciences, Lévi-Strauss’s reading of Mauss ingeniously—some would say 
insidiously—brought cybernetic reason into a certain discursive concordance with the grand 
traditions of French social sciences. This was an administrative and scientific maneuver, to be sure, 
but it was also a political maneuver—that is, it took a position on how fundamental conflicts in 
society were to be defined, endorsing scientistic solutions whose truth resided in the purity of 
mathematics and machinery rather than the messy contingency of historical reason.  
  
Cybernetic Synthesis 
 Lévi-Strauss's first explicit essay to assimilate cybernetics with French social science 
appeared in his idiosyncratic 1950 introduction to the collected works of Marcel Mauss. Lévi-
Strauss reinterpreted Mauss's Essai sur le Don as proof that “the ethnological problem is a problem 
of communication” (Lévi-Strauss, 1987: 36). Recall that Mauss contrasted the exchange of gifts in 
primitive society to the highly technical and mathematical schemes of modern liberalism. Lévi-
Strauss boldly conflated these two positions, arguing that the binding together of primitive societies 
by means of gift-giving manifested the communicative and cybernetic dimension of society in its 
elementary state. In this reading Mauss’s reconstruction of an isolated act as a larger system of 
reciprocal exchange opened the door to a wider reconceptualization of ethnography as a 
communication science. In other words, the structure and rules of such everyday exchange should 
be suitable for informatic or computational analysis.  
 In the introduction Lévi-Strauss criticized Mauss for putting forth non-scientific notions, 
such as the fortuitous and the arbitrary, in explaining the origins of certain native practices and 
concepts (Lévi-Strauss, 1987: 56) and he offered mathematical alternatives as their substitute, 
drawing directly on Jakobson’s recent work with structural linguistics and information theory. 
“[S]ocial anthropology,” he wrote, “can hope to benefit from the immense prospects opened up to 
linguistics itself, through the application of mathematical reasoning to the study of phenomena of 
communication [such as cybernetics and information theory].... [A] large number of ethnological 
and sociological problems ... are only waiting upon the goodwill of mathematicians who could 
enable ethnologists collaborating with them to take decisive steps forward, if not yet to a solution 
of those problems, at least to a preliminary unification of them, which is the condition of their 
solution” (Lévi-Strauss, 1987: 44).ix As in his studies of kinship, mathematics intervened to offer the 
formal “solution” to intractable morasses of historical. social, and phenomenological data. 
Cybernetics and information theory—devised for the purposes of recuperating or stabilizing 
communications in technical media—became exemplars of the new mathematical methods that 
could recuperate disorder, noise, and contingency in human social systems. Most decisive for his 
ongoing rapprochement of American and French schools of social science, Lévi-Strauss’s 
interpretation of Mauss neutralized the most contentious and polemical aspects of Mauss’s 
ethnography—which were also precisely those dimensions that put Mauss at odds with American 
proponents of scientific philanthropy.  
 The rapid industrialization underway in France, spearheaded by armies of experts and 
corporations sponsored by the postwar Marshall Plan, shaped the wider context of intelligibility 
(or perhaps plausibility) of Lévi-Strauss’s synthesis of French sociology with American 
communication engineering. In her cultural history of postwar France, Fast Cars, Clean Bodies, 
Kristin Ross observes that the rapid transformation of France from an agrarian to industrial nation 
(an industrialism notably dominated by IBM rather than Ford, at that) set loose new products and 
new desires that reworked the fabric of French society. Educated middle managers, durable 
consumer goods such as the automobile, and functionalist social sciences all at once “burst onto a 
society that still cherished prewar outlooks with all the force, excitement, disruption, and horror of 
the genuinely new” (Ross, 1995:4). The modernization of French universities attended these 
transformations. The establishment of the Sixième Section embodied one aspect of this new 
modernizing spirit, the rise of structuralism another.  
 Meanwhile, cybernetics seeped into French postwar society along a number of channels 
parallel to that of Lévi-Strauss. In 1950, the same year that Lévi-Strauss published his new 
interpretation of Mauss, Wiener returned to Paris in 1950 to lecture at the Collège de France. This 
time he returned to a growing audience of interested scientists and members of the lay public. 
Major reviews and commentaries in Le Monde, Esprit, and La Nouvelle revue française, as well as attacks 
in the Marxist press, had brought cybernetics to broader if controversial attention (Mindell, 
Gerovitch, and Segal, 2002: 76, 79). During his visit, Wiener lectured on Radio France and 
disseminated articles and interviews on his work with the French press. Szolem’s nephew Benoît 
Mandelbrot, who had copyedited the original text of Cybernetics and would become a noted 
contributor to mathematical theories of information in his own right (Mindell, Gerovitch, and 
Segal, 2002: 76, 80),x co-organized a Rockefeller-funded conference on “Computing Machines and 
Human Thought” during Wiener's stay at the Collège de France, with computer scientist Howard 
Aiken, cybernetician Warren McCulloch, and information theorist Donald MacKay among the 
attendees (Mindell, Gerovitch, and Segal, 2002: 80). Cybernetic themes also cropped up in 
engineer-turned-novelist Alain Robbe-Grillet's experimental writings (Ross, 1995; Schmidgen, 
n.d.), Jean-Luc Godard’s dystopian depiction of a state run by computers, and in the real-life efforts 
by the French Préfecture de Police to automate their fichiers with IBM computers in order to identify 
and track Algerian terrorists (MacMaster, 2010).  
 Particularly in this broader context that framed cybernetics as part of projects in (American) 
modernization and political management, Lévi-Strauss’s synthesis of Mauss and cybernetics 
elicited indignation and opposition from intellectuals whose intellectual orientations were more 
classically French and Marxist. The Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie, in particular, became an 
important forum for resisting structural anthropology as Lévi-Strauss defined it. Chief among the 
opponents was George Gurvitch, who had taught with Lévi-Strauss at the Ecole Libre and had 
invited him to write the introduction to the work of Mauss. Although displeased with Lévi-Strauss’s 
introduction, he allowed its publication (Wilcken, 2010: 177-178). In an essay entitled “The 
Concept of Social Structure” and published in the Cahiers, Gurvitch argued that Lévi-Strauss’s 
recourse to mathematics tended to efface the social and internal contradictions of the societies he 
studied, replacing the unpredictable tensions constitutive of society with an ahistorical 
mathematical symmetry (Gurvitch, 1955). Essays by Alain Touraine and Henri Lefebvre on 
American social science and the concepts of totality radicalized the critique by introducing a 
stronger emphasis on the role of class domination in social-scientific reason (Touraine, 1954; 
Lefebvre, 1955). These theorists argued that the Marxist (and French) conception of totality 
remained sensitive to contradictions but that newer approaches associated with American methods 
invoked styles of calculation and analysis to neutralize conflict and a true sense of the social totality.  
 Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Lefebvre in particular would refine this critique into a 
damning indictment of structuralism. In the 1958 essay “Marxism and the Theory of Information,” 
for example, he ridiculed structuralists’ claim that techniques for measuring telegraph 
transmissions provided suprahistorical procedures for understanding anthropological and 
sociological arrangements. He dismissively labelled cybernetics and information theory as a science 
of “apparatuses [dispositifs] that maintain and consolidate a structure which has been determined 
within and by an information machine” (Lefebvre, 1971: 72). In other words, Lefebvre suggested 
that structuralists ontologized and universalized the artifactual and contingent structures of 
machines. In a response to his Marxist critics, Lévi-Strauss insisted that it was necessary to 
“distinguish scientific findings, strictly speaking, from the political and ideological uses to which 
they are put, all too frequently, in the United States and elsewhere....” (Lévi-Strauss, 1976b)  
 
CECMAS and Semiotics 
In the burgeoning field of French semiotics, however, cybernetic notions of code, 
information, communication, and entropy secured a major foothold, thanks in large part to 
institutional and administrative challenges tied to interdisciplinary coordination and the quest to 
legitimize a new field of study. Specifically, the language of cybernetics offered seemingly neutral 
technical frameworks that could be referred to by scholars of diverse specialties and even 
ideological preferences. These dynamics were most notably the case at the Centre d’Etudes des 
Communications de Masse (CECMAS) (Center for the Study of Mass Communications), the cradle of 
French semiotics in the pivotal 1960s. Georges Friedmann, a sociologist who regularly contributed 
to the Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie, founded CECMAS at the Sixième Section at the Ecole 
Pratique des Hautes Etudes in 1960. But unlike the Cahiers, where cybernetic structuralism 
undermined a common identity elaborated around Maussian and Marxist critiques of capitalist 
technocracy and its myths, cybernetic discourse contributed to formation of an intellectual 
community at CECMAS. Sociologists, linguists, and critics of diverse stripes populated the center, 
giving the jargon of cybernetics and information theory a greater currency than that of sociology 
or linguistics. Scholars schooled in Maussian and Saussurean traditions of analysis, of whom there 
were many, could converge around the strange mélange of structural and informatic tropes 
innovated by Jakobson and Lévi-Strauss. Indeed, the center seemed to realize visions by Dubarle, 
Lévi-Strauss and the Rockefeller Foundation of a center for scientific, experimental, and empirical 
research; and it reflected the kind of interdisciplinary communication Jakobson had already 
undertaken at MIT with colleagues at MIT’s Research Laboratory of Electronics (RLE) (Cherry, 
Halle and Jakobson, 1953; Jakobson and Halle, 1956; Jakobson, Fant, and Halle, 1963).xi 
The roles that scientific administration and institutionalization played in fostering 
cybernetic discourse at CECMAS mirrored that of the American institutions of communication 
research it sought to emulate. Recently founded institutions in the United States with ties to 
communications research—such as the Mental Research Institute (home to Bateson and “the Palo 
Alto School”) and the Institute for Communications Research (ICR) (home to Wilbur Schramm, 
who spearheaded the publication of Shannon and Weaver’s The Mathematical Theory of 
Communication)—found in cybernetic paradigms a resource for coordinating the unwieldy 
disciplinary spread of its members. The language of information also offered an intellectual 
framework conducive to the pursuit of external funding, thus lending currency to experimental 
and emerging topics around ill-defined objects. Directors of CECMAS identified Columbia’s 
Bureau of Applied Social Research (institutional home to Paul Lazarsfeld of the Macy Conferences 
on Cybernetics), Schramm’s ICR, and communications theorist Bernard Berelson (founder of the 
Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences, a leading sponsor of researchers in 
cybernetics, information theory, AI, and systems theory) as models (Anonymous, 1961; Samoyault, 
2017: 203). Lazarsfeld himself had even attended the inaugural planning meeting for CECMAS, 
with Barthes and Edgar and Violette Morin, whom Friedmann enjoined not to leave the study of 
audiovisual communications “all to the Americans” (Samoyault, 2017: 203). This attempt to meet 
American colleagues in the field of communications research reproduced problems, languages, and 
institutional dynamics that cybernetics, as an exemplary discourse of technocratic management, 
proved fit to address. 
 But, by the 1960 establishment of CECMAS, a neutral application of cybernetic discourse 
proved difficult. At that point Jakobson and Lévi-Strauss, not to mention Wiener himself, had been 
touting the importance of cybernetics around Paris for close to a decade. And in that time the 
critiques of cybernetics and information theory had been widely disseminated in the French 
intellectual scenes. Besides the skeptical commentaries of Gurvitch and Lefebvre, Georges 
Canguilhem and even Jacques Lacan had publicly questioned the neutrality of informatic models 
(Geroulanos, 2015: 141; Lacan, 2001: 148). A brisk literature in French on technocracy as a method of 
industrial domination (closely intertwined with a burgeoning interest in bureaucracy) had also 
sprung up with notable contributions by Touraine, Nora Mitrani, and Claude Lefort, among 
others (Touraine, 1959; Meynaud, 1960; Meynaud, 1960; Mitraina, 1960; Fougeyrollas, 1960; Lefort, 
1960; Touraine, 1960; Hecht, 2009).xii Together, commentaries compromised the ability of cybernetics 
to merely facilitate scientific collaboration in a new center, all the more so for the fact that it was a 
center oriented towards taking a major research area from the United States and securing for it a 
foothold in somewhat recently occupied postwar Paris: the capital of a nation still in the throes of 
industrial restructuring, modelled by “human engineering,” “management,” and other fields of 
research imported from the United States (Boltanski, 1981). 
 The researchers at CECMAS faced something of a conundrum. The administrative and 
interdisciplinary tasks confronting the institute, and the intellectual terrain it chose to address, 
invited a turn towards cybernetic reasoning. Insofar as they wanted to join a larger intellectual 
discussion with their American contemporaries in communications research, a turn towards the 
jargon of information theory, already deeply embedded in the structuralist paradigm, provided a 
nearly instantaneous avenue towards participation in this wider international conversation. Yet the 
intellectual milieu in which CECMAS had, if not discredited, at least called into profound question 
the neutrality of cybernetic and informational models, particularly insofar as they related to a 
technocratic refashioning of France since World War II,  CECMAS itself embodied. These suspect 
associations were not deep secrets hidden in the archives of policy decisions by American scientific 
advisors, but were matters of public debate in some of the leading intellectual circles in Paris. In 
such a situation, was it more advised to reject cybernetic reasoning altogether or to rehabilitate it 
by distinguishing, as Lévi-Strauss had done, between its scientific uses and ideological abuses? 
 Between rejection and rehabilitation, researchers of CECMAS chose a third path: Irony. 
Perhaps owing to the concentration of literary-minded intellectuals associated with CECMAS, its 
scholars made the productivity of cybernetic discourse a topic for thematization within their own 
application of that terminology to the analysis of discourse. The result was an experimental—in 
both the scientific and artistic senses of the word—mode of writing that theorized inscription while 
ironically thematizing the historical and political aspects of communication. Through coursework, 
conferences, and the center’s in-house journal Communications, researchers at CECMAS 
imaginatively intermingled the aspirations of American empirical social science with French 
structuralism and Marxist critique. These divided alliances were manifest in the center’s 
membership. Friedmann was a regular contributor to the Marxist-leaning Cahiers Internationaux de 
Sociologie but others had affiliations with the structural and semiotic programs carried on in the 
name of Saussure, Jakobson, and Lévi-Strauss. Counted among this latter group were Barthes (then 
a director of studies at the Ecole Pratique), as well as a class of up and coming graduate students 
and young lecturers, including literary critics Julia Kristeva, Gérard Genette, and Tzvetan 
Todorov; film theorist Christian Metz; and sociologist Jean Baudrillard. Noted lecturers from 
abroad, among them Umberto Eco, occasionally taught at the center as well. Although divided by 
disciplinary training, national backgrounds, and political allegiance, together they developed a 
critical synthesis that borrowed from the scientistic aspirations of structuralism, the interpretive 
vocabularies of cybernetics and information theory, and a sensitivity to the historicity and socially 
situated productivity of science as identified by the likes of Canguilhem and even Lacan. A sense 
of artful showmanship also pervaded the work of many of the center’s contributors, with scholars 
frequently interweaving performative bravado and analytical rigor in their scholarly activities. 
 
Irony and Informatics 
 In its early days the center and its members showed something resembling eccentric 
faithfulness to cybernetics and information theory. Among other things, cybernetic language 
provided an ideal vehicle for exorcising a Sartrean existentialism becoming quickly passé in avant-
garde French intellectual circles. Remarking on Barthes’s transition from a Sartrean to a 
structuralist paradigm, intellectual historian François Dosse observed that “[e]xistentialism as a 
philosophy of subjectivity and of the subject, came under attack and the subject and conscience 
gave way to rules, codes, and structure” (Dosse, 1998: 5). Cybernetic reliance on statistical series 
and on patterned distributions irreducible to human intention (but demonstrably present in human 
speech and action) provided an extraordinary tool for characterizing the consistency and agency 
of language and the arts without recourse to the conscience or human intentionality.  As Barthes 
put it in the introduction to Elements of Semiology, a primer prepared while he was working at 
CECMAS: “There is no doubt that the development of mass communications confers particular 
relevance today upon the vast field of signifying media, just when the success of disciplines such as 
linguistics, information theory, [and] formal logical and structural anthropology provide semantic 
analysis” (Barthes, 1968: 9). According to Barthes, the development of these fields prompted a 
“demand for semiology” (Barthes, 1968: 9).  
Yet Barthes, too, rejected the possibility of establishing a universal science, cybernetic or 
otherwise, that would escape the historical circumstances of its own production. As he deployed 
the tropes of cybernetics and information theory, he also submitted their procedures to ideological 
and historical critique. Consider his 1961 essay “Le message photographique,” published in the 
inaugural issue of Communications, which reinterpreted the schematic account of communication 
introduced by Shannon and adapted by Jakobson to poetics.xiii Source, message, transmitter (or 
sender), signal, code, channel, receiver, and destination comprised all the elements of Shannon’s 
communication schema. Well into the early 1960s scholars accepted these as elements of a neutral 
technological (for Shannon) or formal (for Jakobson) framework. In the 1960s and 1970s some 
French linguists, notably A. J. Greimas and Georges Mounin, came to argue that the model was 
ill-suited to linguistic analysis, constrained as it was by the origins of the theory in the industrial 
problem of economically transmitting signals across media. Barthes, by contrast, embraced both 
the model and its historical production, arguing in effect that semiotic analysis could deploy these 
two elements in mutual interrogation of one another. Taking the example of the press photograph, 
Barthes suggested:  
The press photograph is a message. Considered overall this message is formed by a source 
of emission, a channel of transmission and a point of reception. The source of emission is 
the staff of the newspaper, the group of technicians certain of whom take the photo…. The 
point of reception is the public which reads the paper. As for the channel of transmission, 
this is the newspaper itself.... (Barthes, 1977: 15) 
Barthes twisted this schema to propose a historical and ideological critique of language. In Barthes’s 
hands the concept of the “code” that put a message into a signal no longer aimed to strip all 
communication down to an ideal technoscientific essence that transcended individual utterances. 
Instead the code suggested a dimension of concealment, conspiracy, and occlusion in language. As 
Barthes explained: 
Every [semiotic] code is at once arbitrary and rational; recourse to a code is thus always an 
opportunity for man to prove himself, to test himself through a reason and a liberty. In this 
sense, the analysis of codes perhaps allows an easier and surer historical definition of a 
society than the analysis of its signifieds. (Barthes, 1977: 31) 
 
 
In Barthes’s view, code consisted of the more or less prefabricated set of connotations available to 
the producer of a message. No message could be produced without a code, and the code marked 
the historical and political constraints that acted upon any communication. Code, conceived by 
Shannon as a techno-economic strategy for transmitting signals, morphed in Barthes’s hands into 
the embodiment of political and textual patterns shaping an enunciation. Much as engineers could 
elicit a proximate definition of the limits and probabilities governing a given communication 
system, the semiotician could define the limits and probabilities—historical and political in 
origin—that governed a system of signs. Barthes offered a semiotic and scientific method for 
examining how history and ideology constituted a code, and that code in turn shaped the relative 
liberty of the readers, writers, and critics deploying that code. Over the course of the next decade 
this conception of code would travel across CECMAS, coming to mark the writings of Baudrillard, 
Metz, and other affiliates.  
 This approach, which transvalued both science and critique through reference to technical 
media, tended towards a radical critique of cybernetics and information theory. In equating codes 
with a historically and politically constituted order, cybernetics and information theory, in their 
emphasis upon producing more efficient, compact, and abbreviated codes, were reconstituted as 
components of a contingent, technocratic apparatus. But rather than overturning or rejecting 
cybernetic methods outright, semiotic analysis turned to the problem of decoding. On the one 
hand, this meant an analysis and explanation of codes covertly governing communications, as in 
the press photograph. But it also meant a new effort to strip away the codes structuring everyday 
life, as well as a celebration of those aberrant and everyday methods of reading that revealed or 
rejected the hidden ideological content of communications. Again, it was Barthes who was at the 
forefront of this new analysis. His celebrated book S/Z, the result of a seminar he taught at 
CECMAS from 1968 to 1969, upset the entire cybernetic system. Barthes argued that the essence 
of Balzac’s novella Sarrasine lay not in its exquisite encoding, but rather its decoding. He defined 
the text as “readerly” in order to designate the multitude of conflicting codes that were operative 
within the text, constantly interfering with the possibility of eliciting a single code or meaning. He 
likened it to a “telephone network gone haywire” and claimed that it reversed the logic of formal 
sciences, such as cybernetics and structural linguistics: 
One might call idyllic the communication which unites two partners sheltered from any 
“noise” (in the cybernetic sense of the word), linked by a simple destination, a single thread. 
Narrative communication is not idyllic; its lines of destination are multiple, so that any 
message in it can be properly defined only if it is specified whence it comes and where it is 
going.... Thus, in contrast to idyllic communication, to pure communication (which would 
be, for example, that of the formalized sciences), readerly writing stages a certain “noise,” 
it is the writing of noise, of impure communication; but this noise is not confused, massive, 
unnamable; it is a clear noise made up of connections, not superpositions: it is of a distinct 
“cacography.” (Barthes, 1974: 131-2) 
 
While strategically retaining concepts of code, encoding, redundancy, and communication to 
define the readerly text, Barthes radically redefined it in opposition to efficient procedures of 
communication engineering. The flight from noise, which organized Wiener’s and Shannon’s 
endeavors, was here inverted: the readerly and narrative text staged a noise that was no longer 
confused or erroneous. Cybernetics was reduced to a science of properly and orderly encoding, to 
orthography, while semiotics—in its evolving alliance with Marxism—was a science of the 
improper and errant code: cacography. 
 A similar set of negotiated readings proliferated across the institute and among its associates 
over the next few years. Kristeva cited Norbert Wiener’s research on models as a resource for 
developing a “science of critique” that would be coextensive with a “critique of science” (Kristeva, 
1986: 74-89). This analysis made explicit the reflexive task of analysis to deploy scientific systems 
but also interrogate their imbrication with systems of power and domination.  Metz theorized 
cinema as code, opening the door to a generation of ideological critiques of film. Baudrillard’s book 
The System of Objects, based on a seminar he taught at CECMAS (Anonymous, 1969: 211), directed 
its readers’ attention towards “a cybernetic imaginary mode whose central myth will no longer be 
that of the absolute interrelatedness of the world” (Baudrillard, 1996: 127) In his follow-up 1972 
essay “Requiem for the Media,” he directly attacked communication theory as a vehicle of 
contemporary oppression and accused Jakobson of its propagation. “This theory is accepted 
practically everywhere, strengthened by received evidence and a (highly scientific) formalization 
by one discipline, the semio-linguistics of communication, supported on one side by structural 
linguistics, by information theory on the other” (Baudrillard, 1981: 178), Baudrillard complained. 
In this account, theorization became a vehicle for erasing the historical foundations of a particular 
mode of practice and thereby promoting its ability to enforce new norms of society. “The entire 
conceptual infrastructure of this theory is ideologically connected with dominant practice, as was 
and still is that of classical political economy. It is the equivalent of this political economy in the 
field of communication” (Baudrillard, 1981: 178).xiv  
Baudrillard’s conflation of structuralism, cybernetics, and the contemporary structures of 
political and economic oppression resembled that of his former advisor, Lefebvre. And although it 
was prepared as part of a brutal, post-’68 polemic against left-wing appropriations of 
communication theory, there was also something mundanely factual about its assertion that the 
rise of information theory in universities was “ideologically connected with dominant practice.” 
While Baudrillard likely had no knowledge of the ideological agendas that led the Rockefeller 
Foundation to shepherd the development of social sciences and cybernetics in France, and certainly 
knew nothing of the CIA’s covert funding for Lévi-Strauss’s cybernetics seminar held at UNESCO 
in the 1950s, Baudrillard astutely discerned that the frameworks of cybernetics, information theory, 
and game theory, when transposed into the human sciences, remained rigidly oriented towards 
mapping out the assumptions of industrial engineering. But what sharply distinguished 
Baudrillard’s critique of information theory in the humanities from that of Lefebvre (or Chomsky, 
for that matterxv), was his insistence on semiotic insight. As he put it, “[Communication science] is 
the equivalent of this political economy in the field of communication.” Rather than rejecting 
communication as such, Baudrillard ironically embraced it as the map of meaning that rendered 
the new economies of global communication intelligible. It was not a “false” model ill-suited for 
sociological or literary analysis; it was the perverted model that accurately construed the logic of 
new economies based on a system of simulation and electronic communications. 
Changing conditions in the university itself, embodied by CECMAS, amplified this sense 
of political economy reworking cultural production. On the heels of the founding of the Ecole 
Pratique, research centers of applied social science proliferated in France according to a model of 
research borrowed in part from the United States, in part from emerging culture industries. Lévi-
Strauss’s Laboratoire d'anthropologie sociale, the closest he came to founding the sort of interdisciplinary 
research centers that colleagues such as Jakobson and Clyde Kluckhohn (an anthropologist 
interested in cybernetics and working at Harvard) had at their disposal in the United States, 
provided a paradigm of the new working model. These centers embraced a form of long-term and 
large-scale research completed in teams, often working across specialties. It is worth citing at some 
length the remarks made by Bourdieu in 1989 regarding the changing structures of research in 
France since the 1960s: 
The change in the structure of intellectual establishments (which is itself governed by the 
change in industrial establishments) and the increased complexity of technology combine to 
force many holders of cultural capital to abandon their status as unattached cultural 
producers or small independent inventors for that of salaried cultural producers integrated 
into research teams endowed with expensive equipment and involved in long-term projects. 
This process of relative dispossession, which first took place in the domain of the exact 
sciences … now affects the domain of the human sciences…(Bourdieu, 1996) 
Under these circumstances, fields such as linguistics ceded ground to technical endeavors such as 
communication studies, cybernetics, or even industrial research of the sort modelled by the 
administrative research undertaken by the Princeton Radio Project in the United States in the 
1930s. The new prestige surrounding social science in France in the 1950s, particularly of the 
cybernetic variety promoted by Jakobson and Lévi-Strauss, reflected at the level of academic 
research the changes occurring on the larger scale of political economy.  
The widespread appearance of cybernetic themes in 1960s French human sciences are 
indissociable from the political and industrial conditions shaping the rise of interdisciplinary 
research, and particularly of studies linked to the concept of communication generally. Alongside 
the work of CECMAS, a number of seminal theorists in the 1960s and 1970s addressed these 
changes through their reflections of cybernetics and communication, including Gilbert Simondon 
(L'individuation psychique et collective), Jacques Derrida (Of Grammatology), Michel Serres (esp. Hermes I, 
Hermes II, and The Parasite), and Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (Anti-Oedipus). These works 
conjoined a critique of structuralist idealism with a critical sense for the political stakes of cybernetic 
reason. Their reflections offer a partial record of how a certain cadre of post-structuralist 
intellectuals negotiated the reworking of the universities where they, as young intellectuals, sought 
to make their careers while also establishing the intellectual relevance of their ideas. These thinkers, 
including Barthes, Metz, Kristeva, Baudrillard, and Luce Irigary, completed their advanced 
graduate qualification in the course of the 1950s or 1960s and entered a French university under 
the sway of social scientific modernization. Bourdieu’s hint at the ambivalent appropriative power 
of the new intellectual trends, whereby intellectuals permitted their agendas to be appropriated by 
intellectual models that they themselves, in their aforementioned writings, would in turn 
reappropriate to their own intellectual aims. As supposedly autonomous intellectual exercises gave 
way to abstract systems of bureaucratic management, the structuralist language of codes, 
structures, rules, and programs provided an intellectual handle to grapple with these 
transformations.  
 
From Technocracy to Textocracy 
The foregoing analysis suggests that a common intellectual experience, relating to the 
technocratic refashioning of French universities, drove a group of French scholars associated with 
semiotics to not only grapple with cybernetic themes, but also take up the language of 
communications as both critical instrument and object of reflection. In lieu of a story of opposition 
or subordination to cybernetic (or American) intellectual imperialism, what emerges from the 
intellectual itinerary that shuttles between the Rockefeller Foundation, Marcel Mauss, Wiener and 
his Continental interlocutors, Lévi-Strauss, CECMAS, and the communications-minded French 
thinkers labelled post-structuralist, is a tale of mutual appropriation. In this unfolding of thought, 
the language and institutions of cybernetics played a multifaceted role of affiliation and 
distanciation, by which cybernetics radically disrupted intellectual traditions linked to Mauss, 
phenomenology, and existentialism, introducing instead new paradigms of thought that privileged 
notions of structure, code, rules, and program—which in turn complemented the broader move 
towards technocratic administration in French industry, government, and universities. For 
example, under the impetus of U. S. funding, Mauss’s critical rejection of technology and 
calculation as basis for a holistic theory of society gave way to concepts of communication (Lévi-
Strauss) and code (Barthes) that took technical mediation as a model for social theory. Even when 
critical of cybernetic concepts, these new intellectual positions maintained a productive 
relationship with the intellectual constraints of technocracy.  
How might we name this productive reworking of cybernetic discourse and its technocratic 
legacies? Whatever their differences and oppositions, the writings of Barthes or Baudrillard and 
even Lévi-Strauss (1) questioned the myth of frictionless technocratic communication, either by 
valorizing gaps within primitive thought (Lévi-Strauss’s floating signifiers) or by emphasizing the 
oppressive powers shaping cultural coding (Barthes), while (2) embracing technical inscription 
linked to cybernetics as a model of cultural production and social order. In effect, these theorists 
substituted for an American and cybernetic mythology of technocracy a new mythology, that of 
textocracy.xvi In embracing the notion that machinery, inscription, and techniques pervaded nearly 
every aspect of social and cultural communications, and in tracing cybernetic themes back to the 
origins of Western thought, they swapped the technocratic myth of society as machinery (and in 
want of improved engineering) for a textocratic myth of writing, documentation, technical 
supplementation, and code as the foundation of Western traditions. They exchanged for the 
fantasy of transparent and immediate communications a new dream of pervasive writing as the 
foundation of social order and political power. This project rendered material and palpable the 
covert technical and political machinations at work in structuralist theory, ontologizing those 
machinations into a worldview that saw science, epistemology, society, and psychology as springing 
from the scriptural trace.  
Although the romance with textocracy waned in France by the mid-1970s, the recent push 
across North America and Europe for the founding of new laboratories of digital humanities invites 
us to reconsider the continuing lessons to be taught by the textocratic moment. For example, 
scholars might do well to interrogate the oft-repeated mantra that practical exercises in the digital 
humanities offer a historical break with theoretically oriented literary criticism. Exemplary in this 
instance are the remarks of one of the leading practitioners of the digital humanities, Franco 
Moretti, who writes of his exercises in computer-aided “distant reading” that “while recent literary 
theory was turning for inspiration towards French and German metaphysics, I kept thinking that 
there was actually much more to be learned from the natural and the social sciences….” (Moretti, 
2005) Towards this end Moretti has taken operationalization, among other computational and 
numerical inquiries, as the foundation for a new method based on digital humanities (Moretti, 
2013: 103-19). Much could be said about the permutations that attended the importation of 
postwar French thought into American, Italian, and other national-university contexts. Yet it is 
hard to imagine an intellectual endeavor more resonant with the spirit of postwar French theory 
than the search for operational principles disclosed by computation and other modes drawn from 
social and natural sciences. Indeed, it was the turn towards mathematics, social science, 
computation, and operations that propelled structural anthropology and structural linguistics to 
the forefront of postwar intellectual debates, particularly in France, and there laid the groundwork 
for a new theoretically-oriented literary criticism. If there’s nothing wrong with revising the 
possibilities of computer-aided investigation and models drawn from the sciences, it is equally 
worthwhile to keep in mind how such fantasies already occupy a dominant position in the 
formation of literary and textual studies since World War II.  
Perhaps more importantly, the lesson of textocracy may be that, historically speaking, the 
embrace of abstract computational rules and scientific models, far from allowing the scholar to 
take flight from metaphysics and politics, instead allowed each to take refuge in the other. Indeed, 
it forged political and material constraints that, in turn, enabled new consistencies that cut across 
university and industry, natural science and human science, thanks to the organization of teams 
and centers whose very existence constituted an event in the history of political economy and 
modernization. If CECMAS is any example, this does not mean that such endeavors should be 
avoided as merely “applied” or even as somehow political. Yet the intellectual impact of such 
endeavors may come less from the application of computing to the humanities than from the 
reflexive task of adapting criticism to reflection on computational applications and to the political 
or historical scope of its own intellectual horizons.  
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